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INTRODUCTION
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War,
America's national security regime has increasingly looked to domestic
and international law for its guiding principles.' Past emphasis on polit-
ical ideology has given way in part to a broadly defined theory of "law
enforcement" as an important goal of foreign policy, increasing the prac-
tical stature and relevance of questions of international law and extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction.
Legal concerns have dominated recent American actions and poli-
cies abroad, moving from the realm of largely academic sparring into
questions of vital importance. Recent attention has focused on American
efforts to extradite alleged terrorists responsible for the bombing of Pan
Am flight 103, accompanied by hints that stronger action to retrieve
them may result otherwise. 2 The formation of the allied coalition against
Iraq in the Gulf War of 1991 drew much of its foundation from a new-
found respect for principles of international law.3 Just as significantly,
American military action in Panama drew as much of its formal justifica-
tion from principles of U.S. domestic law as from the law of nations.4
1. See W. Michael Reisman, Editorial Comment, International Law After the Cold War, 84
AM. J. INT'L L. 859 (1990).
2. See Rupert Cornwell, The Lockerbie Bombing: US Reviews Options to Bring Accused to
Trial, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Nov. 16, 1991, at 13 ("[Nleither the White House nor anyone
else in authority would dwell publicly on the unspecified 'options' aired menacingly by Presidential
spokesman Marlin Fitzwater .... ).
3. See, eg., S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 2963d mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/678 (1990) (authoriz-
ing use of force by member nations to carry out Security Council mandate).
4. See Elaine S. Povich, US. Seeks to Build Legal Case for Invasion, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 21,
1989, § 1, at 16.
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The breadth of American enforcement jurisdiction in foreign coun-
tries has also seen significant expansion by the courts and the executive
branch. The Supreme Court recently held that some constitutional pro-
tections do not apply overseas when the government takes action against
foreign nationals.5 This decision followed closely on the heels of two
controversial opinions by the Justice Department's Office of Legal Coun-
sel construing domestic law to allow the American military and law en-
forcement agents the power to arrest foreign nationals outside American
borders.6
The emerging claim of a "new world order"7 thus rests on two pil-
lars: newfound respect for sweeping principles of international law in
relations between nations; and increasing willingness to act abroad
against individuals or private groups to enforce narrower classes of do-
mestic laws that impact American interests on a global scale. The latter
category, in effect, transforms some categories of law enforcement into
national security issues, most notably issues such as terrorism and nar-
cotics trafficking.8 As national security becomes defined as much by law
as politics, the military will assume an increasing role in law enforce-
ment, particularly overseas. In turn, policymakers must take increasing
care to ensure that enforcement actions themselves are in compliance
with legal norms.
The potential for extraterritorial law enforcement by the military
highlights two fundamental tensions. First, any action taken abroad
must be reconciled with the general presumption that nations retain sov-
ereignty within their own territory. Without the approval of foreign na-
tions, American agents who operate abroad risk offending comity
5. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
6. The opinions have not been released to the public. For a general summary, see Michael
Isikoff& Patrick E. Tyler, US. Military Given Foreign Arrest Powers, WAsH. POST, Dec. 16, 1989, at
Al; Ruth Marcus, Justice Department Says FBI Can Seize Fugitives Overseas; Carter-Era Ban on
Making Arrests Without Foreign Nations' Consent is Called "Flawed", WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1989, at
A72; infra text accompanying notes 93-107.
7. President Bush defined the policy at the start of the Persian Gulf War. "We have before us
the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order, a world where
the rule of law, not the law of the jungle governs the conduct of nations." Transcript of the Com-
ments by Bush on the Air Strikes Against the Iraqis, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 17, 1991, at A14.
8. Defining these areas of the law is at best an art form that defies easy categorization. Gener-
ally speaking, we can understand them as challenges to American society and interests posed abroad
outside the traditional framework of ambivalent or unfriendly government action. Two concrete
examples are terrorism against American citizens, which is specifically criminalized worldwide by 18
U.S.C. § 2331 (1988), and narcotics trafficking. Many other offenses have the potential to fit within
this framework, including environmental and economic offenses. Counterespionage against foreign
industrial spies, for example, is reported to be a rising priority for the Central Intelligence Agency.
See George Lardner, Jr., CIA Seeks to Define New Role; Economic Espionage Sparks Wide Debate,
WASH. PosT, Nov. 13, 1990, at Al. These offenses are almost always criminal.
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between nations as well as the international legal system. In some cases,
they may expose themselves to criminal liability within other countries. 9
The challenge is to determine in which areas such enforcement is legiti-
mate and proper within the boundaries of international law, or if some
situations are so extraordinary as to dictate reduced deference to its
principles.
Second, the potential for the military to enforce American civil laws
strains a long-held presumption that the two should remain separate to
protect the rights and civil liberties of citizens. We must ask, then, under
what circumstances it is legitimate for armed forces to police domestic
law within the constitutional and statutory framework. A closely related
question is the definition of the proper legal protections that will apply to
the targets of these enforcement activities overseas.
The issue of military law enforcement abroad implicates many areas
of statutory, constitutional, and international law, but fits neatly into
none of them. Although some attention has been given to each of these
elements in isolation, little to no study has been directed toward their
interaction. This Note seeks to unite the relevant principles of law to
determine under what circumstances such actions may be undertaken to
defend the nation's interests without offending established legal princi-
ples or the rights of individuals. Its scope is necessarily limited to this
aim. A complete discussion of potentially relevant issues of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction alone, for example, would be prohibitive. 10
This Note argues that the use of military resources abroad can be a
legal exercise of enforcement jurisdiction. The nature of most offenses
likely to be enforced in such manner threatens vital national and interna-
tional interests, and almost by definition will fall outside the reach of
conventional means of law enforcement.11 However, the government
9. See Regina v. Kear, 51 C.C.C.3d 574 (Can. 1989) (Canadian court held that bondsman had
no common law power of surety to arrest absconding defendant outside United States); see also
Bruce Zagaris, Mexico Requests Extradition of DEA Agent and a Former Mexican Law Enforcement
Officialfor Kidnapping Dr. Alvarez Machain, 6 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 261 (1990).
10. For the sake of its arguments, this Note will assume that the proper prescriptive jurisdiction
(power to declare certain conduct outside national borders illegal) exists for whatever offenses are
regulated. This is not necessarily always the case, and the presence of prescriptive jurisdiction stands
as a threshold issue at all times. The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that Congress has the
authority to prescribe outside American territorial boundaries. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.
(ARAMCO), 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1230 (1991). The distinction between prescriptive jurisdiction and
enforcement jurisdiction (the power to exercise law enforcement authority) is briefly delineated in
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 431 cmt. a
(1986).
11. Criminals within the territory of the United States, of course, could be apprehended by
more conventional domestic means of enforcement. At the same time, those who commit crimes
broad enough to threaten national interests often choose to do so from abroad because foreign coun-
tries can either knowingly offer a safe haven or are unable to control the actions of those using their
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must ensure that such measures are used only extraordinarily, and only
where the situation clearly justifies violations of international comity that
may result from the arrest.
Part I outlines relevant provisions of American law that limit use of
military force for the enforcement of civil law and discusses why these
laws do not apply overseas or in operations conducted for national secur-
ity purposes. Part II examines the extent to which the President of the
United States may override customary international law principles that
prohibit violations of the sovereignty of foreign nations while committing
law enforcement actions. Part III considers whether legal guarantees
provided by the Constitution or international agreements can act to in-
validate an arrest overseas.
I. THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT: LIMITATIONS ON MILITARY USE
FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT PURPOSES
A. Background
Americans have long maintained a deeply held fear against military
involvement in civil law enforcement matters.12 With the potential for
abuse continually underlying the great power of armed forces, civilian
control of the military has been firmly established since it was set forth
by George Washington early in the nation's history.1 3 Following the
Civil War, federal troops in the South took an active role not only in
enforcement of numerous civil laws, but also extended the scope of their
activity to such egregious activities as interference with the Louisiana
State Legislature.14
In response, Congress passed the Posse Comitatus Act,15 which to-
day prohibits the use of the Army1 6 or Air Force17 to enforce the law
territory. The former is exemplified by terrorists operating from Libya; the latter by Colombian
narcotics cartels.
12. See James P. O'Shaughnessy, Note, The Posse Comitatus Act: Reconstruction Politics Re-
considered, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 703, 704-05 (1976).
13. See MAURICE MATLOFF, AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY 16 (1985) (describing the princi-
ple as "a fundamental safeguard of republican institutions").
14. O'Shaughnessy, supra note 12, at 706.
15. Act of June 18, 1878, ch. 263, 20 Stat. 152 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1988)).
16. Although the statute applies on its face to the Army, it does not apply to National Guard
units when not in federal service. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 989, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 455 (1988),
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2503, 2583. National Guard involvement in antidrug efforts has
become so pervasive that the Guard has taken out full-page advertisements in national newspapers to
promote it. See USA TODAY, Dec. 31, 1990, at E6 (advertisement picturing troops, helicopters, and
local sheriffs in raid on marijuana field, with text reading: "In 1989, we helped stop over 12 billion
dollars of illegal drugs from reaching our kids.").
Guard involvement now goes as far as patrolling civilian events. See Michael Isikoff, Interest In
Grateful Dead Was Not Musical, WAsH. PosT, Aug. 14, 1990, at A4 ("When the Grateful Dead
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"except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the
Constitution or Act of Congress." '18 Named after a practice under which
county sheriffs could impress citizens to aid in enforcement of civil au-
thority, the law effectively separates the military from that function. 19
Although the statutory text does not apply to the Navy20 or Marine
Corps, both services have adhered to its provisions as a matter of admin-
istrative interpretation. 21 In addition, amendments clarifying the scope
of the statute apply directly to these military branches. 22 No prohibi-
tions apply to the Coast Guard.23
The Posse Comitatus Act has played an important role in prevent-
ing military interference with civilian affairs. Its enactment had so
clearly established the respective spheres of authority that by 1948 the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in a now-famous characterization,
viewed the Act as an "obscure and all-but-forgotten statute."'24
Modem times have significantly complicated the picture. In some
areas, civil law enforcement has proven unable to deal with powerful and
played Foxboro, Mass. last month, the police called in the Massachusetts National Guard.... [Tihe
unusual deployment was a new wrinkle in the [Guard's] escalating antidrug mission.").
17. The Air Force was added to the scope of the statute by technical legislation in 1956 follow-
ing its absorption of the duties of the Army Air Forces. See Act of Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, § 18(a),
70A Stat. 626 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1988)).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1385. More explicitly, the law states that "[w]hoever... willfully uses any part
of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." Id
19. Black's Law Dictionary defines posse comitatus as: "The power or force of the county. The
entire population of a county above the age of fifteen, which a sheriff may summon to his assistance
in certain cases, as to aid him in keeping the peace, in pursuing and arresting felons, etc." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1046 (5th ed. 1979).
20. See United States v. Roberts, 779 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 839
(1986).
21. See, eg., 32 C.F.R. § 213.10(c) (1991).
22. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 375 (1988). An excellent analysis of these amendments points out,
however, that they contradict the Posse Comitatus Law in a manner preventing the strict application
of this prohibition to the Navy. The limitations in the 1981 and 1988 amendments apply only to the
increased powers set forth by those amendments. Because the posse comitatus law itself does not
apply on its face to the Navy and Marine Corps, any action outside the scope of those clarifications is
presumptively lawful. Paul J. Rice, New Laws and Insights Encircle the Posse Comitatus Act, 104
MIL. L. REV. 109, 126-27 (1984).
23. See United States v. Chaparro-Almeida, 679 F.2d 423, 425 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S.
1156 (1982). In fact, a 1986 amendment to the Posse Comitatus Act specifically requires assignment
of Coast Guard personnel to Navy vessels in "drug interdiction areas." See Act of Oct. 27, 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 3053, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-75 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 379 (1988)).
24. Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 936 (1st Cir. 1948), cert denied, 336 U.S. 918
(1949). The law did not, in actuality, remain completely dormant. Cases continued irregularly, and
a number of rulings interpreting posse comitatus statutes arose from military involvement in Native
American uprisings at Wounded Knee. See generally O'Shaughnessy, supra note 12, at 719-30 (de-
tailing history of legal challenges based on posse comitatus laws).
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sophisticated criminal enterprises. In other areas, policymakers have de-
fined criminal offenses that address national security issues rather than
matters within the purview of traditional police powers.25 Consistent
with these changes, Congress in the 1980s began to view military involve-
ment as a useful tool to supplement civilian authority.26 The Defense
Department's reaction at the time was lukewarm, suggesting agreement
with critics that it had no role in the area.27 Nonetheless, in 1981, Con-
gress enacted detailed clarifications of the Act allowing increased infor-
mation-sharing and other indirect aid.28 The law again received
clarification and strengthening in 1988.29
In the wake of increased activity following these amendments, posse
comitatus considerations became critical for defendants who were con-
victed due to assistance provided by the armed services. 30 In this con-
text, federal courts have uniformly declined to find serious or large-scale
violations of the Posse Comitatus Act, 31 largely as a result of the careful
and explicit authority contained in the 1981 and 1988 amendments 32 and
the relatively low-level nature of current involvement with law
enforcement. 33
Sending military units abroad with the specific mission of appre-
hending fugitives poses more complex questions which are largely of first
impression. The legality of such a law enforcement action by the armed
25. See, eg., 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1988) (criminalizing murder of Americans abroad when under-
taken to coerce, intimidate, or retaliate against a government).
26. See, eg., Posse Comitatus Act: Hearing on H.R. 3519 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1981) (statement of Rep. Hughes).
27. See id. at 14-17 (statement of William H. Taft IV, General Counsel of the Department of
Defense).
28. Act of Dec. 1, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-86, 95 Stat. 1114 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-378
(1988)).
29. National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-456, 102 Stat.
1918, 2043 (1988) (mandating that military planning consider needs of civilian law enforcement and
compelling Defense Department to share intelligence).
30. See, eg., United States v. Ahumedo-Avendano, 872 F.2d 367 (11th Cir. 1989) (dismissing
complaint alleging violation of Posse Comitatus Act as untimely); United States v. Hartley, 796 F.2d
112 (5th Cir.) (holding that the use of Air Force command and control aircraft to track defendant's
plane for civilian authority does not constitute a violation), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 839 (1986).
31. See, eg., United States v. Roberts, 779 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1986) (refusing to apply Act to
Navy).
32. The text of the original Posse Comitatus Act allows any civil law enforcement actions spe-
cifically approved by Congress. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
33. The degree of military assistance may be quite significant. See Richard Cheney, Special
Defense Department Briefing on National Drug Policy and the Military Role (Sept. 18, 1989) avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Federal News Service File. The types of aid provided, however, are
relatively unobtrusive and unthreatening to civilian interests. The 1981 amendments, for example,
authorize sharing of information and intelligence, see 10 U.S.C. § 371 (1988), loan of equipment, see
id. § 372, and provision of training, see id. § 373.
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forces centers around two questions. First, whether the Posse Comitatus
Act applies outside the territory of the United States. Second, whether
law enforcement undertaken on national security grounds falls outside
the statute as a result of either presidential authority in foreign affairs
and defense or implied authorization by Congress.
B. The Extraterritorial Scope of Posse Comitatus Prohibitions
At a broad level, courts,34 the executive branch,35 and most schol-
ars36 agree that the Posse Comitatus Act does not prohibit extraterrito-
rial arrest by armed forces. Little practical analysis has been undertaken
by courts as to the precise rationale for such a limitation.37 It seems
clear, however, that both the statutory text and scope of congressional
purpose in enacting the law mandate a narrow reading of the law limiting
it to American territory.
The language of the Posse Comitatus Act is arguably cast in abso-
lute terms, e.g., "whoever" and "any part of the Army." By extension,
one could argue that the law is to reach any action within its broad defi-
nition, wherever it may take place. Basic principles of statutory interpre-
tation, however, hold that its effect must stop at the border unless
explicitly extended by Congress abroad, or the subject matter of the law
is inextricably linked to international interests.38 Even if the absolutism
34. See United States v. Yunis (Yunis III), 924 F.2d 1086, 1093-94 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
35. See Isikoff & Tyler, supra note 6, at Al.
36. See, eg., Deanne C. Siemer & Andrew S. Effron, Military Participation in United States
Law Enforcement Activities Overseas: The Extraterritorial Effect of the Posse Comitatus Act, 54 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 1, 54 (1979); see also Christopher A. Abel, Note, Not Fitfor Sea Duty: The Posse
Comitatus Act, The United States Navy, and Federal Law Enforcement at Sea, 31 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 445, 458-59 (1990); John P. Coffey, Note, The Navy's Role in Interdicting Narcotics Traffic"
War on Drugs or Ambush on the Constitution?, 75 GEo. L.J. 1947, 1959 n.69 (1987).
37. Authors Siemer and Effron, see supra note 36, provide an exhaustive study of the back-
ground and theory precluding extraterritorial application of the Posse Comitatus Act; much of this
Section is drawn from their scholarship. The broader scope of this Note, however, adds additional
considerations that require brief discussion, and calls for an updated and somewhat more practically
oriented focus.
38. See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98-99 (1922). Explaining for the Court how
such statutes may be applied abroad, Chief Justice Taft reasoned that "[some offenses] are such that
to limit their locus ... would be greatly to curtail the scope and usefulness of the statute and leave
open a large immunity for frauds .... " Id. at 98. He continued by posing a rhetorical question: "Is
it possible that Congress did not intend by this to include [crimes] done aboard ship on the high seas
or in a foreign port, where it would be most likely to be done?" Id. at 99.
Generally speaking, statutes will also be applied overseas under principles of extraterritorial
jurisdiction when the overseas conduct causes direct effects within the United States. See United
States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1513-14 (S.D. Fla. 1990). Because the harm in a posse comita-
tus violation would tend to inure toward the arrested person, who must be arrested abroad even to
raise the question of extraterritorial application, it is unlikely that the statute would ever meet this
test.
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of the text makes- its scope ambiguous, the presumption continues to lie
against broad application of the Act overseas without clearer legislative
guidance. 39
As a general matter of statutory interpretation, domestic laws do
not apply outside the borders of the United States unless the text of the
law explicitly provides for it.40 Chief Justice Taft wrote in United States
v. Bowman that "[i]f punishment... is to be extended to include those
outside of the strict territorial jurisdiction, it is natural for Congress to
say so in the statute, and failure to do so will negative the purpose of
Congress in this regard. ' 41 The First Circuit used parallel reasoning in
Chandler v. United States42 when it declined to invalidate an arrest
abroad of a Nazi sympathizer for treason in recording World War II
propaganda broadcasts to the United States.43
The intended scope of the Posse Comitatus Act also seems to pre-
vent a broad reading of its application. Just as a literal reading of the
statutory text seems to preclude its extraterritorial application, it is also
apparent that its legislative purpose is limited to military operations
within the United States.
Previous works have exhaustively detailed the formation and history
of the Posse Comitatus Law,44 and a lengthy discussion here would be
repetitive. It seems largely agreed upon, however, that the intent of Con-
gress in approving the law was to prevent conflicts with the authority of
civilian officials rather than to shackle the military. Congressman Kim-
mel, a key participant in the House debate, summarized this principle:
"If... the standing Army of the United States can be used as a posse
comitatus for the execution of the laws, we are living under a military
despotism unqualified and absolute, for what is military despotism but
the use of troops against the people without due authority of the law."'45
After studying the entire debate, authors Siemer and Effron wrote
that such a principle represented, in large part, the consensus of the
Congress:
The context of the debate further underscores development of a com-
mon theme. Debate focused on opposition to the use of the military in
39. See, ag., Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
40. Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98; see also EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (ARAMCO), 111 S. Ct.
1227 (1991) (holding that Congress has authority to enforce laws beyond territorial boundaries, but
whether it has done so in a particular case is a matter of statutory construction).
41. Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98.
42. 171 F.2d 921 (Ist Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949).
43. See id at 936.
44. See, e-g., O'Shaughnessy, supra note 12, at 704-10; Siemer & Effron, supra note 36, at 24-
45.
45. 7 CONG. REc. 3582 (1878), cited in Siemer & Effron, supra note 36, at 27 n.l 13.
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situations where the organized discipline and tactics of a military force
were not required, as for example, in the collection of taxes, service of
process, supervision of elections, and in response to labor strife when
the task was within the existing or potential capability of state forces
.... With respect to extraterritoriality, Congress, in this debate, did
not exhibit concern about use of the troops in terms of the President's
war powers or otherwise in furtherance of American foreign policy.46
As a general matter, military law enforcement abroad would not
give rise to the types of conflict envisioned by Congress in its passage of
the statute. Because such activities would take place outside the normal
reach of conventional law enforcement authorities, there is little danger
that their powers would be usurped.
Although federal courts have stopped short of explicit endorsement
of this interpretation of the law's scope, they have implicitly adopted the
distinction. In United States v. Yunis (Yunis III),47 the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit declined to hold that extensive use of
Navy vessels and aircraft in the apprehension of a Palestinian terrorist
hijacker violated the provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act.48 Yunis was
held aboard a Navy vessel after his apprehension by FBI agents; he was
interrogated there and eventually flown from a Navy aircraft carrier to
federal custody in Washington.49 Although the court technically based
the holding on the exclusion of the Navy from the scope of the Posse
Comitatus Act, they also seemed to rely on the fact that the arrest took
place abroad. "[C]ourts have taken the view that the Posse Comitatus
Act imposes no restriction on use of American armed forces abroad, not-
ing that Congress intended to preclude military intervention in domestic
civil affairs." °50 At a minimum, the Yunis III court declined a clear op-
portunity to repudiate the theory.
Courts have also seemed to recognize such a generally restrictive
scope to the application of the statute in their interpretation of wholly
46. Siemer & Effron, supra note 36, at 44-45.
47. 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
48. See id. at 1093-94.
49. Id. at 1089-90. The Yunis cases collectively address some of the most important contempo-
rary issues in extraterritorial law enforcement. They arise from the case of Fawaz Yunis, a Palestin-
ian terrorist accused of the 1985 hijacking of a Royal Jordanian Airlines jet in Beirut. FBI agents
arrested Yunis in international waters off the coast of Cyprus, and transported him to the United
States on a Navy warship. The first case, United States v. Yunis (Yunis 1), 859 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir.
1988), examined claims made by Yunis under the Bill of Rights, The second case, United States v.
Yunis (Yunis II), 867 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir 1989), concerned slightly more routine issues surrounding
discovery of classified information. The Yunis III case examines a number of diverse issues of pre-
scriptive and enforcement jurisdiction surrounding Yunis's seizure abroad.
50. Yunis III, 924 F.2d at 1093 (citing Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 936 (1st Cir.
1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949) and D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338, 351 (9th Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 935 (1952)).
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domestic cases. Instead of insisting upon rigid separation, the law re-
quires a high threshold of military intervention prior to finding a viola-
tion. In United States v. Casper,51 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit adopted the district court's efforts to formulate a coherent test:
"Were the Army or Air Force personnel used by the civilian law enforce-
ment officers... in such manner that the military personnel subjected the
citizens to the exercise of military power which was regulatory, proscrip-
tive, or compulsory in nature, either presently or prospectively?"5 2
This test provides wide latitude for military involvement in law en-
forcement even within the United States. The Casper opinion dealt with
the provision of indirect assistance5 3 to civilian authorities by military
forces acting under civil supervision. It is particularly noteworthy that
the decision came prior to the passage of the 1981 and 1988 amendments,
which gave explicit congressional approval for such indirect aid. The
court's test, then, can be construed as a common law adoption of the idea
that the Posse Comitatus Act applies only where the armed forces actu-
ally exert authority that should properly belong in civilian hands.54
When translated to a scenario that involves extraterritorial enforce-
ment, one element of the Eighth Circuit holding nonetheless seems at
first to preclude large-scale involvement of the military. In Casper, the
court indicated that the actual exercise of compulsory power by the mili-
tary would constitute a violation of the Posse Comitatus Law.55 Any
direct involvement by armed forces abroad would definitionally fail this
test. If their intervention proved necessary to enforce the laws, the mili-
tary would always act to compel the arrested persons to return to the
United States for trial.
51. 541 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 430 U.S. 970 (1977).
52. d at 1278 (citing United States v. McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186, 194 (D.N.D. 1975), aff'd
sub nom. United States v. Casper, 541 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 970 (1977)).
53. The Casper case was one of a series of cases stemming from Native American uprisings at
Wounded Knee, South Dakota. Civilian law enforcement authorities used material and equipment
provided by the Army and the South Dakota National Guard. Army personnel also acted as observ-
ers and advisors, conducted aerial reconnaissance, and prepared contingency plans for full-scale
intervention to retake the occupied reservation should the civilian efforts have proven inadequate.
See United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916, 921 (D.S.D. 1979).
54. The court found that no such conflict took place, and declined to find a violation. Casper,
541 F.2d at 1278. For a case where the military overstepped its bounds, see United States v. Walden,
490 F.2d 372 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 416 U.S. 983 (1974) (holding that participation of military
officer as undercover agent in civil operation is impermissible).
Another analysis characterizes the Red Feather distinction as an active/passive test. See Rice,
supra note 22, at 116. This approach is important in describing the bounds of permissible military
activity but is not instructive in the extraterritorial context. The active/passive distinction only
partially describes the legislative intent from which it stems and does not address the importance of
conflicting authority in finding a violation.
55. See Casper, 541 F.2d at 1278.
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It is critical to remember, however, that Casper arose within the
context of a domestic enforcement action. If the test is seen as an en-
dorsement of the theory that the Act only applies where there is an ac-
tual conflict with civil authority, the compulsion element of it will not
apply outside the United States. In most cases, it is the precise fact that
other methods are unavailing that leads to the introduction of the mili-
tary as a means of enforcement. There is accordingly no conflict with the
established powers of civil authorities that would contravene the purpose
of the Posse Comitatus Act. Presumably, the prescriptive and regulatory
elements would remain intact, as civil authorities retain broad discretion
to extend abroad the reach of their powers in these areas.5 6
Understanding the overall scope of the Posse Comitatus Act re-
mains a complicated and sometimes highly technical undertaking.5 7 The
propriety of Defense Department assistance to civil authorities often
hinges on minute details that make domestic interpretation of the law
something of an art form. Outside of national borders, however, no con-
flict arises with the jurisdiction of American civil authorities sufficient to
counter the text or purpose of the law.
C. Law Enforcement Exempted from the Statute
Even if an extraterritorial arrest is construed to conflict with the
Act's basic text and purpose, it is permissible where undertaken as an
explicit extension of authority of the political branches of government.
The Posse Comitatus Act defines two classes of law enforcement by the
armed forces that are permissible even where the law would otherwise
prohibit it: those authorized by the Constitution; and those approved by
Congress.
1. Constitutional Powers of the Executive. An elementary tenet of
statutory interpretation holds that courts must construe statutes to avoid
conflicts with the Constitution. 58 To interpret the scope of the Posse
Comitatus Act broadly in cases containing national security elements
56. Yunis III, 924 F.2d at 1090.
57. Although the 1981 and 1988 amendments have added much-needed clarity to the field, the
increased use of military resources to combat narcotics trafficking within U.S. territory has contin-
ued to fuel a wide-ranging debate surrounding the question of which military activities are appropri-
ate within the United States. See generally Roger B. Hohnsbeen, Note, Fourth Amendment and
Posse Comitatus Act Restrictions on Military Involvement in Civil Law Enforcement, 54 GEO. WASH.
L. RaV. 404 (1986) (noting the tension between civilian control of the military and military law
enforcement).
58. See, e.g., McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 112 (1898) ("It is elementary law that
every statute is to be read in the light of the Constitution. However broad and general its language,
it cannot be interpreted as extending beyond those matters which it was within the constitutional
power of the legislature to reach.").
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would raise serious conflicts with the deference given to the executive
branch in military affairs.59 To address this concern, the Act explicitly
exempts constitutionally authorized actions from its operation-a sav-
ings clause designed to avoid conflicts with the enumerated powers of the
executive.6°
Because federal courts have decided the few extraterritoriality cases
before them under an analysis of the general scope of the statute, the
exemptions contained within it have received little examination. If a law
enforcement action is predominantly justified by the executive branch on
foreign policy grounds, it may be characterized as a legal extension of
that power rather than a violation of congressional regulation in the
Posse Comitatus Act. 61
Despite the Constitutional predominance of the executive branch,
Congress may indirectly regulate many aspects of foreign affairs and de-
fense policies under its emunerated legislative powers. Although it has
little say over day-to-day policy, the appropriations power provides a po-
tent weapon to control broad classes of executive conduct of which the
legislature disapproves.6 2 In addition, the emunerated powers to "raise
and support armies" and to "make Rules for the Government and Regu-
lation of the land and Naval forces" 63 allow the legislature to retain a
broad general discretion over the use of the military.64
In a national security context, the Posse Comitatus Act straddles
the border between the executive and legislative powers. The President
has broad authority to deal with international crises. Congress may gen-
erally regulate the manner in which this power is used, but may not in-
terfere with the ongoing exercise of discretion. The distinction between
59. See, eg., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (noting the broad discretion granted to
the executive branch); Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 610 (1838)
("The executive power is vested in a President; and as far as his powers are derived from the consti-
tution, he is beyond the reach of any other department .. "); EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESI-
DENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1957, at 198-201 (1957).
60. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
61. Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 936 (1st Cir. 1948) ("It would be unwarranted to
assume that such a statute was intended to be applicable to occupied enemy territory, where the
military power was in control. . ."), cert denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949).
62. The 1988-1989 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 100-204, 101 Stat. 1331
(1987), for example, contained myriad amendments limiting State Department spending as a means
to guide policy. For example, the Department was ordered to close diplomatic posts in Antigua and
Barbuda, see id § 123, 101 Stat. at 1341, and has been given guidance on the protection of the rights
of Hungarians in Transylvania, see id. § 1205, 101 Stat. at 1411.
63. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cls. 12, 14.
64. The House Armed Services Committee, for example, defines its jurisdiction first and fore-
most in the extremely vague terms of "[c]ommon defense generally." RULES OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES Rule X, cl. l(c)(1).
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the two is subtle and somewhat difficult to determine with precision.65
Although a hypothetical use of the military abroad for law enforcement
purposes would be generally authorized by the executive power, it is far
less certain that it would be permissible if Congress had prohibited that
class of operation in advance.
The problem is not a new one; congressional guidance of executive
decisionmaking is an everyday phenomenon. 66 Reaching a final solution
to the question is problematic, because it quickly degenerates into an is-
sue of circular reasoning.67 The executive is free to use armed forces as
an extension of its power, as long as Congress has not legitimately exer-
cised its own option to prohibit such use. Under the Posse Comitatus
Act, the face of the text passed by Congress would apply to prohibit a
military law enforcement action as long as it does not contravene the
prerogatives reserved to the executive.68 To make matters worse, the di-
viding line between the powers of the two branches is hazy.
This haziness makes the status of the constitutional exception uncer-
tain. In theory, the analysis ultimately depends on how broadly the
scope of the statute is viewed. The Posse Comitatus Act is a valid exer-
tion of the legislative power to regulate the appropriate use of armed
forces. In effect, it facially prohibits use of the military for a certain type
of operation much like other clauses in authorization and appropriations
bills. Because Congress has registered objection to deployments falling
within the law, the constitutional authority of the executive is severely
diminished.69 If the Posse Comitatus Act is viewed as an absolute prohi-
bition on military arrest, the savings clause in theory leaves little room on
its face for such operations, barring an emergency. 70 In practice, how-
ever, the law is narrowly viewed to protect only domestic civil authority.
65. Such difficulties are not unique to the context of foreign affairs, although much rarer there.
The distinction reflects a structural tension inherent in the Constitution. In administrative law, for
example, congressional interference often may conflict with executive rulemaking. See, eg., D.C.
Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
66. See Siemer & Effron, supra note 36, at 17-18. The article sees potential application of the
statute as a limitation on executive authority raising "substantial constitutional questions," but says
little about the countervailing authority of the Congress. It is perhaps worth noting that the authors
of that article were employed at the time of its publication by the Departments of Energy and De-
fense. IMt at 1 nn.*-**.
67. Justice Jackson summarized the conflict between the President and Congress in his concur-
ring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (The Steel Seizure
Case): "A century and a half of partisan debate and scholarly speculation yields no net result but
only supplies more or less apt quotations from respected sources on each side of any question. They
largely cancel each other." Id. at 634-35 (Jackson, J., concurring).
68. Although, as a reminder, it only has force within its scope of applicability.
69. See The Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
70. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862), recognize increased deference to executive
authority in emergency situations.
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Because the scope of the statute does not seem to contemplate its opera-
tion abroad, the President must implicitly retain his power in that area.
2. Authorization by Congress. Under the second statutory exemp-
tion, Congress itself has a strong say in what actions may be permissible.
The Posse Comitatus Act exempts from its terms operations "expressly
authorized... by Act of Congress. ' 71 If Congress approves of any law
enforcement activity by the military, foreign or domestic, it is not pro-
scribed by the Act.
This exemption can be an important source of authority for a Presi-
dent who wishes to use the military for law enforcement purposes. In
examining previous foreign relations questions, federal courts have
shown a willingness to infer congressional approval from almost any sort
of acquiescence in the actions of the executive. 72 By extension, such sup-
port for the actions of the President give a nearly insurmountable consti-
tutional authority at the "maximum" of foreign relations power. 73
Even silence can imply a limited form of consent.74 The textual de-
mand for express authorization, however, requires a more affirmative ac-
tion on the part of Congress. Just as the multitude of statutes that they
must pass simply to fund the Defense Department allows the House and
Senate to impose many of its views upon the executive, Congress also
must bear a much greater share of the responsibility for what takes place
under its nominal direct supervision. Funding for an action constitutes a
form of both explicit and implicit congressional approval for the action. 75
Technically, an appropriation is an "Act of Congress" and implicit ap-
proval through funding might serve to satisfy the requirements of the
statutory exemption.
Presidential power would be particularly strong where an interna-
tional enforcement action came in the course of a long-term policy devel-
oped in consultation with the legislative branch. Military involvement in
combating narcotics trafficking is a powerful example. The Congress has
71. Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1988).
72. See, eg., The Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (arguing that
"congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence" can allow the President to act alone); Holtzman v.
Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1313-14 (2d Cir. 1973) (implicit congressional authorization of Vietnam
War), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974).
73. See The Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
74. See id at 637.
75. See, e-g., Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971). In
considering whether Congress had delegated warmaking power to the executive branch during the
Vietnam war, the court found implied delegation sufficient. "[A]ppellants... argue that congres-
sional authorization cannot, as a matter of law, be inferred from military appropriations or other
war-implementing legislation that does not contain an express and explicit authorization for the
making of war by the President.... [W]e disagree with appellants' interpretation .. " Id. at 1043.
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made clear its desire that the military take on increased involvement in
countering drug smuggling activities on the border and commanded
them to assume a number of specific tasks. The 1981 and 1988 amend-
ments to the Posse Comitatus Act were designed to support this effort.76
Even without such specialized authority, however, the executive could
offer a very strong case to support the proposition that Congress had
acquiesced in almost any action that could be considered even rationally
related to those goals.
Although less powerful, many other types of legislation could fortify
the hand of the President. One justification offered by the United States
in support of its invasion of Panama was protection of the Panama Ca-
nal.77 Congress has often provided for defense of the Canal.78 Further, it
expressed the sense of Congress that the drug-related indictment of Ma-
nuel Noriega reached the level of a national security interest.79 By exten-
sion, the Panama action could easily be defended as a natural
consequence of this approved policy.
As a whole, the two statutory exemptions seem to give the President
tremendous leeway to use the military abroad, even for a potential law
enforcement purpose. If the action is related to an ongoing policy sup-
ported by Congress, it potentially may be defended as authorized by the
legislature and exempt from Posse Comitatus considerations. If the mili-
tary is used to meet a more immediate threat, the executive could justify
its action under its constitutional authority. Either way, Congress must
effectively raise an explicit objection to prevent use of the armed forces to
enforce laws overseas.
Although not completely meaningless, the Posse Comitatus Act
seems to be of greatly reduced concern in an international context.
Within the framework of American statutory law, it is proper for the
President to use the military to enforce domestic laws abroad as long as
the action does not conflict with the reach of civilian authority. Even if
there is such a conflict, use may be permissible if the action is explicitly
76. See, eg., National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-456, 102
Stat. 1918, 2047-49 (1988) (Title XI---"Drug Interdiction and Law Enforcement Support").
77. See Marian N. Leich, Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 545,
545-46 (1990).
78. See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989, § 1301, 102 Stat. at 2059-
60. Section 1301 declares the operations of the U.S. Southern Command to protect the free flow of
shipping through the Canal as vital to U.S. security interests. Id.
79. Section 1303 of the act in fact might be construed to have licensed the Bush Administration
to hunt down Noriega, expressing the sense of Congress that no negotiations should be undertaken
with Noriega to drop the drug indictments then pending, and that to do so would not serve the
national security interests of the United States. See National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal
Year 1989, § 1303, 104 Stat. at 2060-61.
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approved by Congress or undertaken on an emergency basis by the Presi-
dent. From a strictly operational standpoint, American domestic law
permits law enforcement by the military.
II. THE RAPIDLY EXPANDING REACH OF AMERICAN
ENFORCEMENT JURISDICTION ABROAD
Even the most expansive interpretation of executive authority to en-
force national laws overseas would ultimately prove meaningless if
American enforcers had no jurisdiction to do so outside of the country.
Although it is well settled that conduct may be regulated abroad, scrupu-
lous deference to principles of international comity and national sover-
eignty have circumscribed the ability of authorities to act upon
violations.8 0 As recently as 1980, the Carter Administration had explic-
itly denied authority for law enforcement overseas.8 1
Rapid geopolitical changes have forced the American government to
reevaluate carefully these policies as other nations have proven unwilling
or unable to deal with challenges to it within their territories. 82 As a
result, the United States has demonstrated an increasing willingness to
extend the reach of its law enforcement in foreign countries. The execu-
tive branch now believes that it is a legitimate extension of presidential
authority under the Constitution for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) and U.S. military to make arrests on foreign soil, even without the
consent of the host government.8 3
For such an expanded theory of jurisdiction to have practical mean-
ing, it must at a minimum prove justifiable under American domestic
law. An arrest is meaningless if federal courts hold that it is itself illegal
and unenforceable.8 4 To the extent that notions of public international
law commanding respect for state sovereignty are incorporated into do-
mestic law, they preclude arrest abroad. The current policy is notewor-
thy because it recognizes that American law does not in fact command
such absolute respect for territorial sovereignty-an interpretation amply
supported by precedent.
80. See, eg., FTC v. Compagnie De Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1304 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (noting that principles of comity may prevent domestic courts from taking actions offend-
ing foreign nations).
81. See Extraterritorial Apprehension by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 4B Op. Off. Legal
Counsel 543 (1980).
82. See, eg., Cornwell, supra note 2, at 13 (accused terrorists harbored in Libya).
83. See Marcus, supra note 6, at A72; Isikoff & Tyler, supra note 6, at Al.
84. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Alvarez-
Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 857 (1992).
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A. Past and Present Perspectives
The changes in prominence and principle behind the issue of extra-
territorial arrest did not so much evolve as explode. In October 1989, the
media reported that the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel
had provided to first the FBI and then the military what colloquially
became known as "the president's snatch authority".85 The FBI author-
ity came in a legal opinion reportedly prepared that June under the su-
pervision of Assistant Attorney General William P. Barr at the request of
Attorney General Richard Thornburgh.86 This opinion largely dealt
with executive authority to take actions inconsistent with public interna-
tional law. In November, a second opinion followed, effectively approv-
ing extraterritorial arrest powers for the military, based largely on posse
comitatus considerations.87 A month later, American troops were scour-
ing Panama attempting to arrest General Manuel Noriega. 88
The legal analysis in the FBI opinion is important in the military
context because potential military arrest operations involve the same is-
sues of state sovereignty. In substance, this opinion only differs in one
respect from the longstanding policies that had preceded it. The change,
however, was critical. Instead of deferring to the sovereignty and sensi-
bilities of foreign nations, the needs of domestic law and the American
national interest could now take equal or greater precedence. The exact
contents of both opinions remain confidential within the Justice Depart-
ment and have not been released to the public. It is possible, however, to
piece together enough of the substance of the policy from public sources
to provide a general analysis of its legal reasoning.
After the initial newspaper reports on the FBI opinion, Barr and
State Department Legal Adviser Abraham Sofaer appeared before the
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary
85. See Ronald J. Ostrow, FBI Gets OK for Overseas Arrests, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1989, at Al.
86. Id. At the time, Barr headed the Office of Legal Counsel; in the fall of 1991, he was ap-
pointed Attorney General.
87. See Isikoff & Tyler, supra note 6, at Al. The Los Angeles Times reported:
Barr's opinion reviews the history of the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, passed in re-
sponse to opposition to military oversight of Reconstruction Era elections. The ruling con-
cludes that the act sought to bar military interference in functions of the states and was not
meant to address military actions in other countries, an Administration official said.
"All the legislative history (of the act) related to interference with the states, with the
military in conflict with Americans that could undermine confidence in the military," he
said. "It was not Congress' intent for it to apply extraterritorially."
Ronald Ostrow, Ruling Backs U.S. Forces' Police Role, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1989, at Al.
88. Two months earlier, an Army Special Forces team had allegedly been prepared to appre-
hend Colombian narcotics cartel leader Pablo Escobar, who had been reported in Panama. The
Escobar sighting later proved to be erroneous. Isikoff & Tyler, supra note 6, at Al.
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Committee to explain its legal reasoning.89 Barr told the committee that
the opinion represented a change in only the Administration's interpreta-
tion of U.S. law, and not a fundamental change in overall national policy
regarding the territorial integrity of other nations. The result was to be
interpreted as a statement of "the domestic legal authority to make such
[extraterritorial] arrests." 90
The thrust of the idea is simple. Within the American legal system
proper, there is no limit to the scope in which its own provisions may be
enforced. The proposition in some respects is so simple as to be mislead-
ing. At a minimum, some form of external restraint must be incorpo-
rated within that legal system to govern its relations with other legal
systems. It is disingenuous to consider domestic law in isolation when
the very nature of the issue requires consideration within a greater scope.
The question addressed by the Justice Department more properly should
be viewed as an analysis of when it is appropriate to override these con-
siderations of comity.
Respect for sovereign interests of foreign nations is usually incorpo-
rated into American law as respect for international comity. Where law
enforcement officers exercise their functions abroad without the consent
of the appropriate officials in the foreign state, the arrest in theory vio-
lates state sovereignty and customary international law.91 Such an action
is only wholly justifiable within the international realm where the asylum
state makes no protest of the arrest. 92
The Carter Justice Department in 1980 recognized sovereign con-
cerns as the cornerstone of its prohibition on enforcement activities
abroad. Its legal opinion came in response to an FBI plan to apprehend
fugitive financier Robert Vesco in the Bahamas, despite the refusal of the
89. See FBI Authority to Seize Suspects Abroad: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Comm., 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 2-42 (1989) (statements
of William P. Barr and Abraham D. Sofaer) [hereinafter Seizure Hearing].
90. Id. at 26 (statement of Abraham D. Sofaer, State Department Legal Adviser) (emphasis
added).
91. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 432(2) (1986). Comment b to section 432 explains: "It is universally recognized, as a corollary of
state sovereignty, that officials of one state may not exercise their functions in the territory of an-
other state without the latter's consent." Id. § 432 cmt. b.
92. Id. § 432 reporter's note 2 (noting rule of "male captus, bene detentus"). This Note as-
sumes throughout that the asylum state will protest extraterritorial arrest in its territory. In the
absence of such protest, comity is presumed not to be offended despite the presence of a technical
violation of state sovereignty.
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Bahamian government to grant its consent to the arrest.93 "[W]e con-
clude that the FBI only has lawful authority when the asylum state ac-
quiesces to the proposed operation. Since we are to assume that a pro
forma protest to the operation would be filed that fundamental condition
would probably not be satisfied here."' 94 The opinion relied not on do-
mestic law, but on an incorporation of international legal principles.
In sum, asylum state consent appears pivotal to the success of the oper-
ation, both as a matter of litigation and public perception ....
In the current international climate, this country can ill afford an
operation that would permit others to argue that the United States
does not respect international law. We advise you not to authorize the
operation without the asylum state's tacit consent. 95
The Carter Administration opinion would thus grant almost com-
plete deference to foreign governments in enforcement matters taking
place within their territories. Such great deference, however, is inconsis-
tent with the more limited role that international considerations have
been given under American law in the face of countervailing domestic
interests.
The Bush Administration opinion, like that of the Carter Justice
Department, views policy considerations as central to consideration of
extraterritorial arrest issues. The 1989 opinion, however, stops short of
casting sovereign concerns as an impenetrable legal standard, instead
leaving policy determinations in the hands of policymakers. This reading
of the law relies on the fact that comity stands, at best, as customary
international law within the domestic arena.96 In a scenario involving
military law enforcement, those rules can be trumped by the explicit con-
stitutional powers of the President as commander in chief.97
According to Barr, the Bush Administration reexamined the 1980
Office of Legal Counsel opinion in light of the perception that criminal
and terrorist organizations had begun operating with relative impunity
from offshore foreign sanctuaries. "While many nations have cooperated
in our efforts.., by entering into extradition agreements and providing
93. Vesco was "accused of looting hundreds of millions of dollars from mutual funds before
fleeing to Central America in 1973. He also [was] charged with secretly giving $200,000 to former
President Richard Nixon's 1972 reelection campaign to try to obstruct an investigation by the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission." Ostrow, supra note 85, at Al.
94. Extraterritorial Apprehension by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 4B Op. Off. Legal
Counsel 543, 544 (1980).
95. Id. at 556.
96. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 101 cmt. e (1986) (discussing comity); id. § 111 cmt. c (discussing status of international law in
domestic law).
97. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2.
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us with other forms of assistance, some foreign governments have unfor-
tunately failed to take steps to protect the United States from these
predations, and others actually act in complicity with these groups."98
The resulting opinion draws heavily upon the preeminence of the
President's constitutional authority, echoing the importance of the con-
cept in making law enforcement actions permissible under the Posse
Comitatus Act.99 This authority is especially pronounced where several
areas of executive control intersect-in this case, in the fields of foreign
affairs, defense, and law enforcement. 1°° Along those lines, the Office of
Legal Counsel now contends that "the executive and legislative branches,
acting within the scope of their respective authority, may take or direct
actions which depart from customary international law." 101 The conten-
tion has technical merit because international law only has legal force in
the United States insofar as it is not superseded by actions of the political
branches.10 2 Without recognition of controlling domestic acts, the
United States would be unable itself to contribute to the formation of
norms of customary law.
For additional support, the Justice Department cited two judicial
cornerstones of executive power. In the national security field, the opin-
ion relied on Justice Jackson's concurrence in The Steel Seizure Case,
which stated that courts "should indulge the widest latitude of interpre-
tation to sustain [the President's] executive function to command the in-
struments of national force, at least when turned against the outside
world for the security of our society."10 3 For inherent law enforcement
power, the Office of Legal Counsel analysis cited In re Neagle.1 4
To make its ultimate point that this power can override customary
international norms, Barr's testimony finally noted the decision of the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Garcia-Mir v. Meese.105
98. Seizure Hearing, supra note 89, at 9 (statement of William P. Barr, Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel).
99. See id. at 12.
100. See id. at 16.
101. Id. at 14.
102. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (holding that "controlling executive or
legislative act[s]" may supplant legal norms of customary international law).
103. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 645 (1952) (The Steel Seizure
Case) (Jackson, J., concurring).
104. 135 U.S. 1 (1890). In re Neagle held that the executive branch did not require explicit
statutory authority in pursuit of its duty to faithfully execute the nation's laws. The Barr statement
quoted Justice Miller's opinion, which held that that authority extended to the "rights, duties, and
obligations growing out of the Constitution itself, our international relations, and all the protection
implied by the nature of the government under the Constitution." Seizure Hearing, supra note 89, at
6 (quoting In re Neagle, 135 U.S. at 17).
105. 788 F.2d 1446 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 889 (1986).
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Garcia-Mir arose from a challenge to the detention of Cuban aliens arriv-
ing in the Mariel boatlift. The court agreed that the executive could law-
fully take actions that might be inconsistent with public international law
when exercising constitutional authority. 10 6
Whatever distaste opponents of extraterritorial arrest may have for
its use as a tool of foreign policy, the Justice Department argues that it is
not in itself illegal in the overall scheme of American law. Under this
logic, the outweighed demands of international law become prudential
constraints on the development of policy to use presidential authority.
Because the consequences of a breach of comity will fall to it to remedy
in the political arena, the executive should be free to determine its own
course of action. Barr explained the overall position:
[W]hen the President is making a decision in the area of extrater-
ritorial law enforcement, we have the intersection of a number of re-
sponsibilities. He acts as the foremost law enforcement officer in the
country. He acts as the administrator of the foreign relations of the
United States and as Commander in Chief. He has a range of responsi-
bilities, including the responsibility to take into account international
law and the international obligations of the United States....
But when push comes to shove, after he has weighed all of those
factors, and he determines that it is in the national interest to pursue a
particular law enforcement operation overseas, that judgment, as a
matter of domestic law, overrides customary international law, and
that is an authorized, legal, constitutional action for American agents
to engage in.
At the same time, it is a violation, or under many circumstances it
could be a violation of international law, and we would have to be
prepared to take the consequences of that violation.107
B. Presidential Authority to Override Customary International Law
The opinion from the Bush Justice Department received a great deal
of attention-largely because the authority to override nominal consider-
ations of comity to serve American national interests is sparse in the
criminal context. The position that sovereignty is not an absolute bar to
executive action has much stronger support in judicial precedent, how-
ever, than contemporary wisdom may recognize.108 The point has not
106. See id at 1454-55.
107. Seizure Hearing, supra note 89, at 61.
108. The principle is begrudgingly acknowledged in the Restatement. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115 reporter's note 3 (1986)
("There is authority for the view that the President has the power, when acting within his constitu-
tional authority, to disregard a rule of international law... notwithstanding that international law
and agreements are law of the United States .... ").
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only been long recognized in American law, but has also been broadly
applied in diverse cases that allege violations of international law.
As far back as 1815, Chief Justice Marshall wrote on the issue of
extraterritorial apprehension in The Ship Richmond v. United States:109
The seizure... within the territorial jurisdiction of a foreign power is
certainly an offence against that power, which must be adjusted be-
tween the two governments. This court can take no cognizance of it;
and the majority of the court is of opinion that the law does not con-
nect that trespass, if it be one, with the subsequent seizure by the civil
authority ... so as to annul the proceedings of that court 110
The theme returned in the classic rendition case Ker v. Illinois,"'1
which held that seizure of a criminal suspect in Peru without the consent
of the Peruvian government could not affect the defendant's status in
American courts because, in effect, no domestic laws had been vio-
lated.' 12 The case recognized, however, that such a seizure could have
important ramifications on international affairs and, again, viewed it as
an issue committed largely to the executive branch:
It must be remembered that this view of the subject does not leave the
prisoner or the government of Peru without remedy for his unauthor-
ized seizure within its territory. [A treaty] with that country provides
for the extradition of persons charged with kidnapping, and on de-
mand from Peru, Julian, the party who is guilty of it, could be surren-
dered and tried in its courts for this violation of its laws.1 13
Although Garcia-Mir remains the main contemporary case regard-
ing presidential authority, the principle was recognized with equal
strength in United States v. Yunis (Yunis III): 114
Whatever merit appellant's claim may have as a matter of interna-
tional law, they cannot prevail before this court. Yunis seeks to por-
tray international law as a self-executing code that trumps domestic
law whenever the two conflict. That effort misconceives the role of
judges as appliers of international law and as participants in the federal
system. Our duty is to enforce the Constitution, laws, and treaties of
109. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 102 (1815).
110. Id. at 104.
111. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
112. In his opinion, Justice Miller seemed to have difficulty even finding an articulation of the
legal arguments that Ker had attempted to make against the seizure.
The question of how far his forcible seizure in another country, and transfer by vio-
lence, force, or fraud, to this country, could be made available to resist trial in the State
ourt ... is one which we do not feel called upon to decide, for in that transaction we do
not see that the Constitution, or laws, or treaties of the United States guarantee him any
protection.
Id. at 444.
113. Id. Indeed, this exact remedy has been sought by foreign countries in modem times. See,
e.g., Zagaris, supra note 9, at 261 (reporting that the Mexican government sought extradition of a
DEA agent involved in an extraterritorial arrest).
114. 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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the United States, not to conform the law of the land to norms of cus-
tomary international law. 115
Authority to override customary international law is so readily in-
ferred that courts have not limited the principle solely to the President.
Congressional action in pursuit of the constitutional duties of the legisla-
tive branch also will be deemed sufficient to trump international norms.
In Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan,1 16
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that no
enactment of Congress could be challenged on the ground that it violates
customary law, even as set forth by the International Court of Justice:
[T]he key question is not simply whether the United States has violated
[international legal norms] but whether such violations can be reme-
died by an American court or whether they can only be redressed on
an international level. In short, do violations of international law have
domestic legal consequences? The answer largely depends on what
form the "violation" takes.... The answer is "no" if the type of inter-
national obligation that Congress and the President violate is either a
treaty or a rule of customary international law.' 17
These opinions still seem somewhat unsatisfactory because they do
not readily explain why customary international law is effectively thrown
out of the equation despite its incorporation into American law. 18 Con-
temporary courts hoping to reform the basic doctrine of The Ship Rich-
mond on these grounds, however, should tread carefully. The most
abundant contemporary source of precedent in conflict with foreign legal
systems sensitive to their own prerogatives are cases that involve exten-
sions of the power of American courts in civil litigation. Like cases in-
volving the political branches, these decisions ultimately reduce to
pragmatism rather than consistent exercise of theory.
American courts have usually declined to give a preeminent role to
considerations of comity with foreign law where the main questions of
fact or law are American or the main effect of the questioned act falls
upon the United States, despite possible affront to other nations. Foreign
legal systems with more centralized and authoritarian views of judicial
power, for example, often view service of process by American lawyers
115. Id. at 1091.
116. 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Reagan concerned a challenge to congressional appropria-
tion of funds for the Nicaraguan contras.
117. Id. at 935.
118. Extensive debate on the theoretical aspects of executive branch authority to conduct action
inconsistent with international law may be found in Jonathan Charney, The Power of the Executive
Branch of the United States Government to Violate Customary International Law, 80 AM. J. INT'L. L.
913 (1986); Michael Glennon, Can the President Do No Wrongs?, 80 AM. J. INT'L. L. 923 (1986);
Louis Henkin, The President and International Law, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 930 (1986).
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within their nations as offensive to national sovereignty.' 19 Under the
domestic laws of these nations, the actions are not only invalid, but can
be grounds for diplomatic protest.120 Under a strict incorporation of na-
tional sovereignty theory into American domestic law, neither process
could be permissible. In reality, however, this example amply demon-
strates that the role of comity within the American legal system is rou-
tinely reduced to advance American interests abroad.
Another similar parallel arises from enforcement of American dis-
covery orders in foreign nations. The American judicial process in these
cases poses a direct affront to the laws of the countries concerned that is
theoretically even more intrusive to sovereign interests than an extrater-
ritorial arrest. 12 1 Although arrest results from situations in which na-
tions are unwilling or unable to produce fugitives, discovery frequently
arises in direct conflict with foreign blocking statutes specifically in-
tended to prohibit the exact actions the American order seeks to com-
pel.122 American courts will nonetheless not give preclusive effect to the
sovereign interests of the foreign state where they believe that American
interests take precedence. 23
C. Policy Considerations Counseling Against Extraterritorial Arrest
The legal framework provides broad deference to activities taken
abroad by the executive branch irrespective of sovereignty concerns.
Such deference within the domestic legal system does not, however, re-
lieve American responsibilities under international law.' 24 A violation
119. See RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 411 n.13 (5th ed. 1988)
("Many civil law countries require that service of process be effected by a local public official.").
120. Id. at 411 ("Many civil-law nations ... regard it as an infringement of their sovereignty if
such official acts are performed within their territory by anybody other than their own judges and
other officials."); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 432 reporter's note 1 (1986) ("The states in whose territory such activity occurred
have usually protested such action as violations of international law.").
121. See generally SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 119, at 443-48. As the authors note, in
some countries the taking of a deposition by a private person can lead to criminal liability. Switzer-
land has jailed foreign lawyers for doing so. Harry L. Jones, International Judicial Assistance, 62
YALE L.J. 515, 520, 528-29 (1953).
122. See, eg., Soci&6 Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales v. Rog-
ers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 442 reporters note 1 (1986).
123. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 691 F.2d 1384 (1lth Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462
U.S. 1119 (1983); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 709 F. Supp. 192 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
124. This Note assumes, arguendo, that violations of state sovereignty for the purposes of arrest
are not justifiable under international law. A tenable argument can be made that such operations
can be legitimately conducted in defense of nationals, particularly when carried out as a military
operation. Full development of the argument within the scope of this Note, however, would be
prohibitive. For its broad contours, see Seizure Hearing, supra note 89, at 34 (statement of Abraham
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that is meaningless under domestic law may incur real consequences on
the world stage. Respect for international law and state sovereignty is an
important element of American foreign policy. 125 Despite its presump-
tive legality, these policy considerations dictate that extraterritorial
arrest cannot be considered as more than an extraordinary remedy to be
undertaken in pursuit of unusually important national interests.
Appearing on the same congressional panel with Barr, State Depart-
ment Legal Adviser Abraham Sofaer took pains to delineate the policy
limitations that international law places on extraterritorial arrest.' 26
Noting that "the United States has repeatedly associated itself with the
view that unconsented arrests violate the principle of territorial integ-
rity," 127 Sofaer acknowledged that "decisions about any extraterritorial
arrest entail grave potential implications for U.S. personnel, for the
United States, and for our relations with other states." 128
The benefits of arrest would have to be weighed carefully in light of
American interests implicated in a breach. Agents involved in the arrest
are placed at personal risk.' 29 The United States might be open to civil
suit in both the foreign country and international tribunals.1 30 Having
established the precedent, the American government would not be well
equipped to counter a similar "arrest" by a foreign nation in American
D. Sofaer) ("Despite its importance, however, the principle of territorial integrity is not entitled to
absolute deference in international law.").
125. Considerations of sovereignty are, for example, of heightened concern to the administration
where American territory is violated. Despite his approval of both opinions on extraterritorial arrest
while heading the Office of Legal Counsel, Barr took a different view of sovereignty after becoming
Attorney General. In discussing Justice Department plans to bolster immigration control on the
Mexican border, Barr complained that "as we welcome people in the front door... we see people
crashing through the back door and the back window, violating our laws, flouting our sovereignty
and ignoring our process." Haya El Nasser, Holes Punched in Border Plan: Won't Slow Illegal
Flow, Critics Say, USA TODAY, Feb. 11, 1992, at A3.
126. The Legal Adviser has primary responsibility within the U.S. government for the advance-
ment of international law. Current Developments, The Role of the Legal Adviser of the Department
of State, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 358, 358-59 (1991). Placed in an awkward position when the official
administration position on extraterritorial arrest downplayed its importance, Judge Sofaer's remarks
represent a delicate balancing act highlighting these concerns without countering the Justice Depart-
ment's interpretation of domestic law.
127. Seizure Hearing, supra note 89, at 32 (statement of Abraham D. Sofaer). Judge Sofaer cited
cases in which Canadian authorities arrested suspects within the United States. In 1876, Secretary of
State Fish protested such an arrest on the grounds that "a violation of the sovereignty of the United
States had been committed." Id. Conversely, when two bail bondsmen arrested a suspect in Can-
ada, the State of Florida released the individual and deported the bondsmen to Canada, where they
were convicted of kidnapping.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 39. Of note in the military context is Judge Sofaer's observation that "many States
will not accord POW status to military personnel apprehended in support of an unconsented law
enforcement action." Id.
130. Id. at 40.
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territory. 131 Most importantly, however, "[a]n unconsented, extraterri-
torial arrest would inevitably have an adverse impact on our bilateral
relations with the country in which we act." 132
Commentators on the new arrest policies expanded the State De-
partment analysis, criticizing them as improper means to return accused
criminals to the United States. Focusing on American obligations under
customary international law, they object to assertion of enforcement ju-
risdiction abroad as offensive to foreign nations.13 3 These arguments
quickly fizzle because of the subordinate status of customary law in the
domestic regime.1 34 As a result, most recent scholarship has actually
agreed that relevant considerations are policy-based rather than legal. 135
Sensitive to such public perception that the broad interpretation of
the law adopted by the Bush Administration might be used as an excuse
for "cowboy diplomacy" abroad, Barr also recognized that policy consid-
erations could militate strongly against an otherwise permissible action.
"The 1989 opinion," Barr noted in his prepared testimony, "takes no
position supporting or opposing, as a policy matter, the use of the FBI or
any other Executive Branch officials to make apprehensions in contra-
vention of customary international law." 136 Under questioning by the
Judiciary Committee, Barr said that he envisioned potential use of the
131. The reciprocity argument has been a favorite of critics of the extraterritorial arrest policy.
See, eg., Abraham Abram ovsky, Extraterritorial Abductions: America's "Catch and Snatch" Policy
Run Amok, 31 VA. J. INT'L. L. 151 (1991). The article dramatically opens with a scenario involving
arrest of the CEO of ARAMCO by Iraqi agents for plundering the Rumalia oilfields. See id.
Although the reciprocity argument has some analytical force, pragmatically it is of reduced
importance. Foreign nations must weigh their own policy interests in making an extraterritorial
arrest. Presumably, the prospect of facing the consequences of a violation of American sovereignty
would be even less attractive than the list of negative factors noted by Sofaer. Further, American
cooperation with international law enforcement efforts would leave little real justification for resort-
ing to such measures. See Seizure Hearing, supra note 89, at 40 (statement of Abraham D. Sofaer).
132. Seizure Hearing, supra note 89, at 40.
133. See, eg., Abramovsky, supra note 131, at 201-02; Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law En-
forcement Abroad: The Constitution and International Law, 83 AM. J. INT'L. L. 880 (1989); Andreas
F. Lowenfeld, Kidnapping by Government Order: A Follow-Up, 84 AM. J. INT'L. L. 712 (1990)
[hereinafter Lowenfeld, Kidnapping].
134. Professor Lowenfeld candidly "acknowledge[s] that the reported decisions here and abroad
did not, on the whole support my argument." Lowenfeld, Kidnapping, supra note 133, at 712. In-
stead, he argues that "these decisions were out of step with contemporary international law and U.S.
constitutional law." Id.
135. Professor Abramovsky does not contend that extraterritorial arrest must always be prohib-
ited as a matter of law, but rather urges courts to invoke their supervisory powers to remedy viola-
tions of international law. See Abramovsky, supra note 131, at 190. The bulk of his arguments are
made on policy grounds. See id. at 201-08.
136. Seizure Hearing, supra note 89, at 12.
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arrest authority only under "a limited range of circumstances in the area
of counterterrorism and counternarcotics."1 37
Barr also noted that specific legal obligations to other nations could
make extraterritorial enforcements legally impermissible in certain cir-
cumstances even under domestic law: 138 "[T]he 1989 opinion does not
address the legal implications of deploying the FBI in violation of provi-
sions of self-executing treaties or treaties that have been implemented by
legislation." 139 Such treaties can place significant tangible limitations on
the freedom of the executive branch to pursue extraterritorial arrest.
Although the treaty issue will be subsequently discussed in more
depth, 14° it is important to note here that international agreements can
pose significant legal roadblocks in the path of international arrests.1 41
For the most part, American interests will coincide with pursuing
arrest through regular extradition channels, specific "prosecute or extra-
dite" agreements, 42 or diplomatic cooperation.1 43 Where there are for-
mal agreements, this may be the only legal option. In addition, the
prospect of condemnation by the international community places a
strong disincentive on American policymakers to pursue extraterritorial
arrest where not clearly justifiable. 144
Ultimately, however, some nations choose to support real threats to
American security as an extension of national policy. When these coun-
tries assist others in lawbreaking, they cannot invoke the protections of
legal norms that they themselves have cast aside. It is axiomatic that law
enforcement authorities must sometimes themselves violate laws in the
137. Id. at 61.
138. For cases considering the impact of specific treaties upon American legal obligation, see
infra text accompanying notes 199-204.
139. Seizure Hearing, supra note 89, at 12.
140. See infra text accompanying notes 187-207.
141. Under questioning, for example, Barr told the subcommittee that "there's obviously no
consideration whatever being given to this kind of operation in a situation like Colombia where the
Government is actively cooperating with us and is engaged in extradition." Seizure Hearing, supra
note 89, at 68.
142. Antiterrorism treaties between the United States and foreign nations require the country in
which the suspect is present either to prosecute them through that nation's legal system, or extradite
the parties to the nation which is targeted by their actions. See, eg., International Convention
Against the Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res. 146, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 245, U.N.
Doc. A/34/146 (1979) (signed December 17, 1979, entered into force June 4, 1983), reprinted in 18
I.L.M. 1456 (1979). Article 8 contains the alternate duties to prosecute or extradite.
143. See Michael P. Scharf, The Jury Is Still out on the Need for an International Criminal
Court, 1991 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 135, 149 ("[E]xperience has shown the existing system to be
increasingly effective in bringing international criminals to justice.").
144. The paradigm case being the arrest of Adolf Eichmann in Argentina by Israeli agents. The
move drew strong condemnation from the U.N. Security Council in response to the violation of
Argentine sovereignty. The Council held that the act could "endanger international peace and se-
curity". U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 865th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.865 (1960).
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line of duty.145 Barr explained the policy to the Judiciary Committee:
"The purpose of law is ultimately to protect innocent people from
predators. And the people we're fighting are ruthless predators. They're
not restrained by law. They mock the law, and they manipulate interna-
tional rules of law to shield themselves." 146
III. CONSTITUTIONAL AND TREATY CONSIDERATIONS
Extraterritorial apprehension also implicates legal questions under
the Constitution, which grants guarantees to criminal suspects under the
Bill of Rights and mandates observance of treaties as the supreme law of
the land. Although almost all authoritative judicial opinion has found
that extraterritorial arrest cannot be said to be illegal per se under the
Constitution, 147 improper conduct during an arrest can invalidate the
arrest. Further, the executive branch must take special care to observe
proper procedure regarding international agreements.
A. Constitutional Issues
Constitutional issues that involve extraterritorial arrest reduce to
two fundamental questions. First, does the Constitution apply abroad?
Second, what guarantees does the Constitution provide to a suspect who
is arrested overseas? 148 The Supreme Court has already dealt directly
and indirectly with these core questions, and its answers so far have not
encouraged advocates of strong restraint on law enforcement abroad.
1. Extraterritorial Scope of Constitutional Provisions. In United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,149 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the
Court that the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause did not apply to
the search of an alien's residence in Mexico. The majority determined
145. Authority for executive branch agents to do so is recognized in In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1
(1890). In that case, U.S. Marshal David Neagle shot and killed an assailant while protecting
Supreme Court Justice Field. Justice Miller wrote that "[Tihe marshal of the United States..,
being present at the critical moment, when prompt action was necessary, found it to be his duty, a
duty which he had no liberty to refuse to perform, to take the steps which resulted in Terry's death."
Id. at 69.
146. Seizure Hearing, supra note 89, at 64.
147. See Paul B. Stephan III, Constitutional Limits on International Rendition of Criminal Sus.
pects, 20 VA. J. INT'L. L. 777, 800 (1980) ("[C]ourts have sought to impose strong penalties for what
is clearly unpalatable but not necessarily unconstitutional action. The resulting analytical confusion
has produced precedents that... run counter to current doctrine.").
148. Professor Stephan first offered this framework and provided a third question: What reme-
dies are available for violations? See id. at 777-78. His article examines the conceptual issues and
history that underlie these questions more thoroughly than the brief analysis here.
149. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
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the case along two lines of argument; its significance in the greater
scheme will depend on which endures in later analysis.
The first, seemingly technical, argument, is based on the text of the
Fourth Amendment. The Amendment guarantees that "[t]he right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."150
Chief Justice Rehnquist interpreted the phrase "the people" to mean
only American citizens, who bind the government through the contract
of the Constitution. "While this textual exegesis is by no means conclu-
sive, it suggests that 'the people' protected by the Fourth Amendment
... refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or
who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to
be considered part of that community."151 Under such a narrow justifi-
cation, this argument may only have force where the exact words of the
Constitution allow its application.1 52
The language of the majority opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez suggests,
however, that the case may stand for the broader proposition that forms
the Court's second argument. One of the ongoing debates in constitu-
tional jurisprudence is whether the United States is bound in all cases by
the document, or if instead it is a compact between the citizenry and its
government.153 In rejecting Verdugo-Urquidez's citation of Reid v. Cov-
ert,154 Chief Justice Rehnquist effectively rejected the first theory. "Reid
stands for no such sweeping proposition," he wrote.15 5 According to the
150. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
151. erdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265-66 (citing United States ex reL Turner v. Williams, 194
U.S. 279, 292 (1904) (holding that an excludable alien is not entitled to First Amendment rights
because "[hie does not become one of the people to whom these things are secured by our
Constitution")).
152. See Ruth Wedgwood, Decision: United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 84 AM. J. INT'L L.
747, 750 (1990). Defendants hoping to test other constitutional provisions governing actions taken
abroad would be ill-advised to rely on the Fifth Amendment, as Chief Justice Rehnquist also explic-
itly ruled it out on the same basis. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269. It is important to note,
however, that Fifth Amendment trial rights still appear to apply, because the trials occur within "the
sovereign territory of the United States." Id.
153. The compact theory is recognized by Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 471 (1793)
("iTihe Constitution of the United States is ... a compact made by the people of the United States to
govern themselves."). The organic theory, which argues that the Constitution binds the government
in all actions, is advocated in Note, The Extraterritorial Applicability of the Fourth Amendment, 102
HARV. L. REv. 1672 (1989); see also Roszell D. Hunter IV, Note, The Extraterritorial Application of
the Constitution- Unalienable Rights?, 72 VA. L. Rav. 649, 651-53 (1986).
154. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). Specifically, Verdugo-Urquidez attempted to use language from the
opinion to argue that the government was always bound by constitutional provisions. "The United
States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other source. It
can only act in accordance with all the limitations of the Constitution." Id. at 5-6 (footnote omit-
ted). Reid arose in the context, however, of U.S. military personnel stationed abroad.
155. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 270.
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
majority, Verdugo-Urquidez's ties to the United States were simply in-
sufficient to invoke constitutional rights abroad.15 6
Adoption of the compact theory finds some additional force in
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. ,157 not directly cited in that
section of the opinion. Curtiss- Wright is most frequently cited to illus-
trate presidential authority over foreign affairs. More importantly in this
context, however, its finding is based on the conclusion that "[n]either
the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in
foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens." 158 The absence of
reliance on this dicta in the Verdugo-Urquidez opinion may indicate that
the Court wished only to avoid adopting the organic theory without fully
endorsing the compact theory.
Because the Court did not make its point explicitly, it is unclear if
any rule applies in all circumstances.15 9 The reluctance of the Rehnquist
Court to apply constitutional provisions broadly to an extraterritorial
law enforcement action, however, suggests that challenges to such arrests
may not even succeed in reaching a hearing on the merits.
Over and above the general applicability of the Constitution to
aliens abroad, the Court also considered its force in the context of na-
tional security. In a passage particularly important to the subject matter
of this Note, Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested that American activities
abroad would receive particular leeway when effectuating national policy
156. See id. The opinion did note, however, that in some cases non-citizens could invoke consti-
tutional rights. Id. at 269 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950) ("The alien...
has been accorded a generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his identity with our
society.")).
Conversely, citing concurring opinions by Justices Frankfurter and Harlan in Reid, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist implied that even American citizens might be unable to take advantage of some parts
of the Constitution abroad. "[They] declined even to hold that United States citizens were entitled
to the full range of constitutional protections in all overseas criminal prosecutions." Id. at 270.
This analysis squares with the Court's decision in In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891), which re-
jected the idea that all "protection[s] and guarantee[s] ... secured by the Constitution to citizens of
the United States at home, should be enjoyed by them abroad." Id. at 463. In some circumstances,
the court is willing to hold that the Constitution "can have no operation in another country." Id. at
464.
157. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
158. Id. at 318. Presumably "in respect of our own citizens" allows exercise of prescriptive
jurisdiction abroad against foreign nationals. Importantly, however, the Court held that treaties and
principles of international law stood in the Constitution's stead in limiting options of the executive
branch. See id This important limitation is discussed infra at notes 187-207 and accompanying
text.
159. Editorial commentators did not hesitate to read the opinion broadly. See, e.g., William
Pfaff, The High Court's Pernicious Ruling That "We're No. 1" CHI. TRIB., Mar. 6, 1990, at 17 ("The
Supreme Court holds that American national interest is superior to a foreign person's claim to secur-
ity in his or her person and house.").
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interests as opposed to routine law enforcement. His opinion implied
that actions by the armed forces would receive even more deference:
[T]he result of accepting [the organic] claim would have significant
and deleterious consequences for the United States in conducting activ-
ities beyond its boundaries. The rule... would apply not only to law
enforcement operations abroad, but also to other foreign policy opera-
tions which might result in "searches or seizures." The United States
frequently employs armed forces outside this country--over 200 times
in our history-for the protection of American citizens or national se-
curity. Application of the Fourth Amendment to those circumstances
could significantly disrupt the ability of the political branches to re-
spond to foreign situations involving our national interest. 16°
A President who contemplates deployment of military force for law
enforcement goals related to national security could scarcely have
stronger support. Under this analysis, the steady progression of defer-
ence to the executive seems to have reached its zenith. The Ship Rich-
mond allows the executive to override the relatively weak legal force
provided by customary international law within the United States. Chief
Justice Rehnquist's analysis in Verdugo-Urquidez hints that the Supreme
Court could be willing to allow Presidential power under Article II to
override even the Bill of Rights in limited circumstances concerning
aliens. The basic principle has made extraordinary appearances in past
Supreme Court decisions implicating national security, but never so
bluntly in a contemporary case.161
The implications of the opinion may seem harsh, leaving, in theory,
unfettered discretion in the hands of the executive branch. To adopt the
opposite position and extend constitutional protections to aliens in all
circumstances, however, would have an even more profound impact.
Justice Jackson explained the logic in Johnson v. Eisentrager:162
[A broad construction of the Constitution] would mean that dur-
ing military occupation irreconcilable enemy elements, guerilla fight-
ers, and "werewolves" could require the American Judiciary to assure
them freedom of speech, press, and assembly, as in the First Amend-
ment, right to bear arms as in the Second, security against "unreasona-
ble" searches and seizures as in the Fourth, as well as rights to jury
trials as in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 163
160. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 273-74 (citation omitted).
161. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), stands strongly for the principle. As
widely discredited as Korematsu has been, it seems noteworthy that Verdugo-Urquidez appears to
have reaffirmed its essence. Importantly, however, the events in Korematsu took place in the United
States and concerned American citizens, contrary to the core theories in Verdugo-Urquidez.
162. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
163. Id. at 784.
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In modem times where large-scale military occupation is rapidly be-
coming anachronistic, this discussion from 1950 does not seem particu-
larly persuasive. Justice Jackson's basic logic, however, has enduring
value in an increasingly complex world. Professor Stephan extended
Jackson's analogy:
Those citizens of North Vietnam who suffered risk of a "taking" of
"life" without "due process" during the bombing of that country could
have sought an injunction against the raids based on the fifth amend-
ment, and survivors of those killed now could seek damages against
our government. Those Iranians who were temporarily detained in the
desert during the unsuccessful attempt to rescue the U.S. hostages
could sue for violations of their fourth amendment rights. Foreign
leaders everywhere could seek to enjoin the surveillance of their ac-
tions by U.S. intelligence services. 164
Chief Justice Rehnquist's holding in Verdugo-Urquidez thus appears
not to be aimed at nationalistic expansion of American jurisdiction, but
rather at real practical and legal problems that would arise under differ-
ent law. General challenges to extraterritorial arrest on constitutional
grounds in American courts could result in a flood of litigation challeng-
ing foreign policy decisions. This type of case is the essence of the non-
justiciable political question.1 65
2. Specific Constitutional Provisions. Whether or not aliens may
invoke the Constitution in challenging alleged breaches outside Ameri-
can territory ultimately is a moot point when considering military arrest.
Even assuming that the text applies, no provision of the Constitution
seems to prevent overseas arrest per se. As Justice Black put it, "[t]here
is nothing in the Constitution that requires a court to permit a guilty
person rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought to
trial against his will."1 66
Legal challenges to enforcement operations abroad most logically
center on the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.1 67 The majority of Fourth
Amendment cases arise from a lack of probable cause or issuance of a
164. Stephan, supra note 147, at 786.
165. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). Such cases contain both "a textually demon-
strable commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department" and "a lack of judicially dis-
coverable and manageable standards for resolving it." Id. In the military context, see also Gilligan
v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1973) (holding suit challenging training standards of Ohio National
Guard to be a political question, because it would require courts to supervise Guard activities),
166. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952).
167. See Extraterritorial Apprehension by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 4B Op. Off. Legal
Counsel 543, 553 (1980) ("There are two constitutional arguments available to [the fugitive]. The
first is that he is subject to an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment. The second is the Fifth Amendment due process argument. .. ").
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proper warrant.168 Fifth Amendment claims cover a: range of conduct
that might deprive suspects of due process rights. Where the special abil-
ities of military units prove necessary to arrest a given suspect, they stand
in the stead of more conventional law enforcement. 169 Such use is en-
tirely consistent with the Constitution, which has never been read to pro-
hibit extraterritorial arrest per se. 170 However, military units that
conduct arrests should take care to comply with the constitutional stan-
dards that would otherwise apply.
Fifth Amendment doctrines nicely illustrate the point. In Ker v. Il-
linois,171 the Supreme Court refused to find a due process violation where
the suspect was arrested in Peru and brought to the United States.
"[U]nless there was some positive provision of the Constitution or of the
laws of this country violated in bringing him into court, it is not easy to
see how he can say that he is there 'without due process of law,' within
the meaning of the constitutional provision." 172 The Court continued:
The 'due process of law' here guaranteed is complied with when
the party is regularly indicted by the proper grand jury in the State
court, [and] has a trial .... [B]ut, for mere irregularities in the manner
in which he may be brought into the custody of the law, we do not
think he is entitled to say that he should not be tried at all for the
crime with which he is charged in a regular indictment. 173
Ker has remained largely undisturbed to the present day. 174 Courts
may still invalidate arrests on due process grounds, however, where the
conduct of the agents making the arrest constitutes "cruel, inhuman, and
outrageous treatment." 175 The doctrine stems from United States v. Tos-
canino,176 a leading case addressing egregious conduct in extraterritorial
168. See, eg., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 126 (1975).
169. When American troops went to Panama in 1989, President Bush issued a memorandum to
Secretary of Defense Cheney directing and authorizing military units to apprehend Noriega and
others under indictment. He apparently did so solely under his executive authority, and ordered
that any persons apprehended were to be turned over to civil law enforcement as soon as possible.
See Memorandum Directing the Apprehension of General Manuel Noriega and Others in Panama
Indicted in the United States for Drug-Related Offenses, 25 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1976 (Dec.
20, 1989).
170. See United States v. Yunis (Yunis III), 924 F.2d 1086, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("Nor would
a violation of the [Posse Comitatus] regulations at issue amount to a constitutional violation, making
application of an exclusionary rule or similar prophylactic measures inappropriate.").
171. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
172. Id. at 440.
173. Id.
174. See Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952) ("This Court has never departed from the
rule announced [in Ker] that the power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the
fact that he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a 'forcible abduction.' ").
175. United States ex reL Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001
(1975).
176. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
900 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:867
arrest. 177 Toscanino is based in some respects on a strained legal founda-
tion, and its holding has not been closely followed in subsequent cases or
by other circuits.178 The case still has value, however, as a demonstra-
tion of impermissible conduct in a particular arrest that might rise to the
level of a due process violation, despite a general presumption under Ker
that irregular arrest itself cannot provide a basis for dismissal. 179
The Toscanino principle is particularly attractive to courts that wish
to maintain supervisory control over arrests of suspects brought before
them. Simply because the executive branch has acted to apprehend a
suspect does not mean that the judiciary must become "accomplices in
willful disobedience of law."' 80 As Judge Oakes stated:
[W]e can reach a time when in the interest of establishing and
maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence, we may
wish to bar jurisdiction in an abduction case as a matter not of consti-
tutional law but in the exercise of our supervisory power... To my
mind the Government in the laudable interest of stopping the interna-
tional drug traffic is by these repeated abductions inviting exercise of
that supervisory power in the interest of the greater good of preserving
respect for the law.
18
'
Such a formulation strikes a balance between the state interest in
bringing criminal suspects to justice and the rights of the individual to be
treated fairly. Finding the boundaries of "egregious" conduct, however,
may prove somewhat subjective.182 But in the end, the due process anal-
ysis reaffirms two key points: One, nothing in the Constitution prohibits
177. Toscanino's case seems to stand as a paradigm of subjectively unacceptable government
conduct. Agents lured Toscanino, accused of conspiracy to import narcotics into the United States,
and his pregnant wife from their home to a Montevideo bowling alley. Once there, seven agents
knocked him unconscious and threw him into a car. In the car, he was blindfolded and bound. The
car took a circuitous route to the Brazilian border. In route, the agents discussed changing license
plates to avoid the Uruguayan police, and, while the car was stopped, the agents held a gun to
Toscanino's head to make him hold still to avoid detection. Id. at 269.
178. The Toscanino court attempted to distinguish Ker against the backdrop of a constitutional
due process "revolution," and argued that the Fifth Amendment was no longer "limited to the
guarantee of'fair' procedure at trial." Id. at 272. Its support came from seemingly inapposite cases
such as Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (extending Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to
states through Fourteenth Amendment).
Other circuits have rejected this reformation and continued to follow Ker. See, e.g., United
States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1232 (1lth Cir. 1986); United States v. Marzano, 537 F.2d 257,
271-72 (7th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).
179. Lujan recognized this distinction. See 510 F.2d at 66.
180. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943).
181. United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir.) (Oakes, J., concurring), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 847 (1975).
182. One example is particularly appropriate to the analysis within the context of both due pro-
cess and military law enforcement. While making an early ruling in the trial of General Noriega,
Judge Hoeveler was forced to confront a unique fact pattern in drawing lines of acceptable conduct
within the Toscanino framework:
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law enforcement by military units; and two, those units may not, how-
ever, engage in unconstitutional conduct in the course of making arrests.
One brief example under Fourth Amendment analysis demonstrates
that the executive will follow important requirements of the criminal jus-
tice system, despite the fact that the Constitution might not strictly re-
quire him to do so. Following the arrival of U.S. troops in Panama,
General Manuel Noriega successfuflly evaded capture for days, finally
taking asylum in the Papal Nunciature in Panama City. American
troops surrounded the building, joined by thousands of agitated
Panamanians. After eleven days of standoff, Noriega finally surrendered
to the troops. The tense encounter grew to a climax as armed Army
officers carefully escorted him by military helicopter to Howard Air
Force Base and the object of the confrontation: Drug Enforcement
Agency operatives waiting to fulfill the letter of the Fourth Amend-
ment.183 The agents arrested Noriega pursuant to the indictment pend-
ing against him in Florida and escorted him there on an uneventful trip
by cargo plane.18 4
The facts need not be put so dramatically except to prove a point.
Consideration of military arrest inevitably focuses on the power that the
troops might bring to bear in the course of the operation. It does not
follow, however, that any arrest in such circumstances must be violent or
outside the basic boundaries of procedure. There is no evidence that the
Army mistreated Noriega in any way.185 A warrant may not have been
constitutionally necessary under the circumstances. 186 Nonetheless, the
juggernaut of the U.S. Southern Command served only one law enforce-
ment function-the quiet delivery of Noriega to two DEA agents carry-
ing an arrest warrant.
On the present record, the only incident which comes close to any kind of personal
mistreatment is the above mentioned event in which American troops blasted the Papal
Nunciature in Panama City with loud rock-and-roll music in an apparent effort to drive
Noriega out. While there are those who might consider continued exposure to such music
an Eighth Amendment violation, it is the opinion of the Court that such action does not
rise to the level of egregious misconduct sufficient to constitute a due process violation.
United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1531 n.27 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
183. Id. at 1511.
184. Id.
185. See id.
186. Exemption from the warrant requirement is recognized where "the exigencies of the situa-
tion made that course imperative." McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948). In addi-
tion, as Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in Verdugo-Urquidez, a warrant in Panama would have been
"a dead letter outside the United States." United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274
(1990). The approach is inconsistent because a warrant presumably should accompany assertion of
enforcement jurisdiction. Nonetheless, it demonstrates that the executive took particular pains to
meet constitutional requirements in the Noriega case.
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B. Treaties and International Agreements
Treaties and other international agreements can pose significant po-
tential obstacles to the exercise of enforcement jurisdiction abroad by
American military forces. 187 Where the executive branch has expressed
consent to be bound by extradition agreements with foreign nations,188
such commitments stand under the Constitution as the supreme law of
the land.18 9 Treaties that provide the exclusive means for recovering
fugitives in other nations technically may be read to preclude other
means of arrest as long as they remain in force.190
Practically speaking, however, international agreements will usually
prove insufficient to defeat exercise of enforcement jurisdiction abroad
for three reasons. First, failure of the asylum state to produce fugitives
might constitute a breach of the agreement sufficient to allow the United
States permissibly to take action outside the text of the treaty. Second,
the constitutional authority of the executive branch over treaties and na-
tional security allows it to suspend or terminate extradition agreements.
This power additionally allows the President to protect high level na-
tional interests irrespective of treaty provisions. Finally, although there
is some conflict in the area, it appears that federal courts may refuse to
invalidate arrests on the ground that an extradition treaty is the exclusive
lawful means to capture fugitives in other countries.
1. Treaty Breach Relieves Obligations. When another nation re-
fuses to produce a fugitive located within its territory despite an extradi-
tion agreement that obligates it to do so, it breaches the treaty.191
187. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to determine the legal status of extraterritorial
arrest conducted contrary to an international agreement. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946
F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), cerL granted, 112 S. Ct. 857 (1992). The arguments in this case are
discussed at some length in Mitchell J. Matorin, Note, Unchaining the Law: The Legality of Extra-
territorial Abduction in Lieu of Extradition, 41 DUKE L.J. 907 (1992). Although it is possible that
the Court will visit all of the areas of the law discussed in this section, it is more likely that a decision
in Alvarez-Machain will be made on narrower grounds. Accordingly, this Note will make its argu-
ments reflecting the law as of early 1992, subject to any changes that may be forthcoming in the
decision.
188. A list of the nations with which the United States has entered into extradition treaties is
available in the notes after 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1988). In the absence of a treaty, extraterritorial arrest
would be governed solely by the considerations of comity discussed supra at text accompanying
notes 107-21.
189. See U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2
This Constitution, and ... all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Au-
thority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, and any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
190. See, eg., Extradition Treaty, Jan. 21, 1977, U.S.-U.K., 28 U.S.T. 227.
191. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 475 (1986). This assumes that other principles governing extradition and specific treaty provisions
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Although each government retains some discretion to refuse extradition
requests, failure to comply usually opens it to reprisals by the other party
to the agreement. 192 Such reprisals can include suspension or termina-
tion of the reciprocal obligations of the country demanding the criminal
suspect. 193 Breach by the asylum state may void any restraints imposed
by treaty and leave the American government free to legally pursue self-
help inconsistent with the agreement under both international and do-
mestic law. 194
To fully justify extraterritorial apprehension as a remedy, the Amer-
ican government would have to comply with procedural requirements to
place the action in the proper legal context. Presumably, it could not
invoke a "breach" by the asylum state if it had never taken the proper
steps to request extradition. 195 Further, the Vienna Convention by its
own terms provides the sole guidelines governing suspension and termi-
nation of international agreements.' 96 To end its obligations lawfully,
treaty law requires notification both that the aggrieved nation considers
the treaty to be in breach and of what actions it may take to remedy the
would require delivery of the fugitive. If the suspect had been accused of an offense that is not a
crime in the asylum state, for example, the principle of double criminality could preclude extradi-
tion. A list of general considerations that can allow a nation to refuse extradition can be found in id.
§ 476. Because many treaties allow nations to make discretionary refusals to produce fugitives,
breach must technically be inferred in some instances from a refusal to meet treaty obligations in
good faith.
192. See id. § 475 cmt. g.
193. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679 (Although the
United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention, the agreement codifies most of the customary
international law of treaties.). Article 60, section I provides that "[a] material breach of a bilateral
treaty by one of the parties entitles the other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the
treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in part." Id at 701. Section 3 defines a material
breach in part as "the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or
purpose of the treaty." Id
194. Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 473 (1913).
195. Scrupulous adherence to the requirements of the law in pursuit of Libyan intelligence oper-
atives suspected of bombing Pan Am flight 103 is one example of how these requirements are ful-
filled in practice. See Elaine Sciolino, US. and Its Allies to Move on Libya over Air Bombings, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 19, 1991, at Al ("The three Governments [United States, United Kingdom, France]
appear to be moving toward a step by step approach that mirrors the strategy used against Iraq after
its invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.").
196. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 193, art. 42, para. 2, at 696 ("The
termination of a treaty, its denunciation or the withdrawal of a party, may take place only as a result
of the application of the provisions of the treaty or of the present Convention. The same rule applies
to suspension of the operation of a treaty.").
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violation. 197 Although these requirements pose no more than a formalis-
tic hurdle to arrest abroad, conscientious adherence could defeat treaty-
based objections to arrest at a fundamental level.198
2. Constitutional Authority of the Executive Branch. Along with
the authority to oversee national defense, the executive branch also su-
pervises the negotiation and termination of treaties. 199 Insofar as an ex-
traterritorial arrest represents a political decision by the President in
furtherance of these duties, nullification by the judiciary based on treaty
provisions interferes unconstitutionally with that textually committed
discretion. 200 If a President chooses to terminate a treaty by executive
action, it is inconsistent for a court to dictate that the treaty is, in its
view, in force.
Although courts have an acknowledged role in adjudicating individ-
ual rights under established treaties, 201 past cases have recognized that
broader issues where treaty status is uncertain are generally outside judi-
cial cognizance:
[l]t is not "a judicial question, whether a treaty with a foreign sover-
eign has been violated by [the President] ... whether the views and
acts of a foreign sovereign, manifested through his representative have
given just occasion to the political departments of our government to
withhold the execution of a promise contained in a treaty, or to act in
direct contravention of such promise .... These powers have not been
confided by the people to the judiciary, which has no suitable means to
exercise them; but to the executive and the legislative departments
"202
197. Id. art. 65, paras. 1-2, at 703. The Vienna Convention in theory imposes a three-month
waiting period before any reprisal action may be taken. The agreement waives the waiting period,
however, in cases of special urgency. An apprehension could be easily justified before the tolling of
the three months, in that fugitives undoubtedly would be encouraged to flee by scrupulous observa-
tion of the deadline.
198. The most prominent and thoroughly researched contemporary case on the interrelationship
between treaty law and extraterritorial arrest provides practical proof of the point. See United States
v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991). That case makes no mention of the reciprocal
obligations of asylum states. The reason for this is because the United States never requested extra-
dition in the case. The court refused to uphold the arrest.
199. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (empowering the President to make treaties with the
advice and consent of the Senate). The power to terminate treaties has been inferred as accompany-
ing this power, especially where termination by breach is alleged. See, eg., Charlton v. Kelly, 229
U.S. 447, 476 (1913) (holding that executive department has discretion over termination of treaties).
200. Arguably, the matter constitutes a noncognizable political question. See Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
201. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 326(2) (1986).
202. Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855) (No. 13,799); accord Foster v. Neil-
son, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 309 (1829).
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As seen in so many other areas of the law, treaty issues involving
military judgment also require special deference to the President.20 3
Broad reading of treaty provisions in national security situations could
significantly impair the ability of the executive to carry out its constitu-
tional functions. Because treaty provisions inconsistent with the Consti-
tution are void,20 4 no treaty could practically be read to prohibit a
military action. Such a result could not be properly reconciled with the
constitutional authority of the judiciary.
3. Exclusivity of Treaty Provisions. The majority of recent cases
concerning extraterritorial apprehension have dealt with issues less
sweeping than the overall validity of treaties or judicial interpretation.
Instead, they have focused on the practical issue of whether an extradi-
tion treaty provides the sole means for recovering fugitives in other na-
tions.20 5 Because the question is extensively discussed elsewhere in this
issue of the Duke Law Journal,20 6 this Note will only mention it as a
relevant consideration. Although domestic courts will seemingly not de-
fine treaties as the sole remedy,20 7 the terms of most treaties represent a
commitment by the United States to follow them in requesting surrender
of fugitives abroad. To remain fully consistent with the law, policymak-
ers should take the appropriate steps to present arrest abroad as a rem-
edy for treaty breach rather than take unilateral action outside the
agreement.
IV. CONCLUSION
Any situation that involves the issue of extraterritorial arrest repre-
sents a fundamental breakdown in international relations, especially
where the United States must consider the use of armed forces as a rem-
edy. The President must retain discretion to defend American national
interests abroad, and the law grants wide latitude to the executive in tak-
ing appropriate steps to do so. When steps taken in response include law
enforcement activity, legal issues become entangled with national secur-
ity policy, leaving courts to determine the appropriate level of interven-
tion in reviewing such actions.
203. See, eg., Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
204. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
205. See, eg., Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1342.
206. See Matorin, supra note 187.
207. Id. at 912-23. International law assumes that treaties are the only means to compel recov-
ery of fugitives abroad. This assumption is based, however, solely on considerations of sovereignty
discussed supra notes 91-123 and accompanying text.
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Courts have wisely recognized that considerations of international
comity and defense policy fall outside the scope of judicial review, which
must be limited to its traditional role of ensuring that defendants receive
full and fair adjudication of their individual cases. Ultimately, legal con-
siderations in overseas seizures are reduced to this simple issue. For
although any chain of events ending in such an arrest must inevitably
involve broad ramifications on an international scale, in the end, the law
is asked to do no more than address the acts of those who set the chain in
motion.
